Exploiting a district level data set on the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya, this paper investigates why polarization between ethnic groups results in violent conflict in some cases, but not in others. After the announcement of highly controversial election results in December 2007, ethnic-based violence erupted in many parts of Kenya. Violence occurred more often and with greater intensity in areas characterized by a high level of polarization between the Kikuyu ethnic group and other ethnic communities. At the same time, in several districts with a very high level of Kikuyu-nonKikuyu polarization, only few and sporadic incidences of violence occurred. The paper attempts to explain why in areas with similar levels of ethnic polarization, a flawed election process produced so different reactions. Results suggest that the main triggers of ethnic violence were poverty, unemployment among young males, and deteriorating public services. On the other hand, there is little evidence that clashes resulted from land inequality, land pressure or political competition.
Introduction 1
Twenty six years after the publication of Donald Horowitz' seminal book, "Ethnic Groups in Conflict", ethnic violence remains a central issues on the international agenda, as exemplified by recent events in Kyrgyzstan, Darfur, Cote d'Ivoire and elsewhere. Yet at the same time the observation made by Fearon and Laitin (1996) , that most ethnic groups, most of the time live in peace with each other, remains valid. This paper exploits a data set in on the incidence and intensity of violence following the 2007/8 elections in Kenya to investigate why tensions between ethnic groups sometimes, but not always, lead to violent conflict. Although the conflict in Kenya should not be classified as a "civil war", the paper is nevertheless related to the large literature on cross-country differences in the onset and duration of civil war, summarized in Collier and Hoeffler (2007) and Blattman and Miguel (2010) . The effects of ethnic diversity have been studied intensely in this literature. Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) used the ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) index and found no robust, monotonous relationship between ethnic diversity and the incidence and duration of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler report an inverse-U shaped relationship). On the other hand, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol The key observation made in this paper is that, while the bulk of violence occurred in areas that were polarized between Kikuyus and non-Kikuyus, other areas with a very similar ethnic composition experienced little or no violence. In other words, similar levels of ethnic polarization led to violence in some areas but not, or to a much lesser extent, in others. The paper exploits a district level data set to investigate why this variation in levels of violence occurred.
Results show that ethnic violence was triggered by poverty, unemployment among young males, and decrease in access to essential, public services (in particular, access to piped water). Somewhat surprisingly, we find little evidence that ethnic clashes were triggered by land inequality, land pressure or political competition 1 We are grateful for very useful comments and other inputs from Anne Christensen, Jørgen Elklit, Markus Goldstein, Jane Kabubo-Mariara, Kawawa Masumba Kilango, Samuel Kipruto and Johan Mistiaen. We thank the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics for generously providing access to household survey data. All remaining errors are our own. (2005) argued that conflict is not driven by fractionalization (the coexistence of many, relatively small groups) but rather by polarization (the coexistence of a few groups of similar size) and found a significant, positive effect of polarization on the probability of a country experiencing civil war. In contrast with these studies, the present paper does not ask whether but when ethnic diversity leads to violent conflict. In this regard it resembles Sambanis (2001) who also investigated the specific drivers of ethnic-, as opposed to "revolutionary" or other types of wars.
The paper contributes to the small, but growing group of studies that exploit intra-country variation in civil conflict to conduct quantitative analyses of the determinants of war and civil strife (Deininger 2003 , Mancini 2008 , Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan 2009 , Murshed and Gates 2005 , Do and Iyer 2010 , Hattlebak 2010 . The paper most closely related to ours is the contribution by Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero (2010) , who exploit a household level data set to investigate the triggers of the 2007/8 post-election violence in Kenya. They find that households who experienced land disputes before the election, live in places where "gangs connected to politics" are active, or reside in urban areas, are more likely to report being exposed to the post-election violence than others. The present study, conducted at the district level, complements Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero's paper, both because studies at different levels of aggregation each have distinct advantages, and because the variables included in the analyses are quite different. For example, Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero use a different measure of ethnic diversity than we do and do not include measures of unemployment and public service provision, both key variables in this study. The key question asked here, why did Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu ethnic polarization lead to much more violence in some areas than in others, is not asked by Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents background information about ethnic and political violence in Kenya and about the 2007 elections, the post-election violence and its aftermath. Section 3 discusses theory and presents hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 describes the data set and section 5 shows descriptive statistics and discusses the estimation strategy. Section 6 presents regression results. The robustness of main results to the influence of outliers, spill-over effects between neighboring districts, choice of regression estimator and other factors are explored. 
Ethnicity and political violence in Kenya
Compared with its neighbors to the East, North and West (Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda), Kenya has been an oasis of calm for most of its independent history. However, ethnic and political violence was never completely absent. During colonial times, Kikuyus from central Kenya waged the famous Mau-Mau rebellion against British rule (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) . The rebellion was to a large extent motivated by the desire to regain land confiscated for European settlement. It led to the internment of more than 100,000 Kikuyus and other native Kenyans in camps, the nature of which was compared by Elkins (2005) to the Gulags of Josef Stalin.
From Independence in 1963, Kenyan politics was dominated by the influence of ethnicity.
Edward Miguel (2004) has compared the nation-building efforts of Tanzania's Founding Father, Julius Nyerere, with the lack of such efforts by Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya. For example,
Nyerere promoted Swahili as a national language in Tanzania, while vernacular languages have retained a much stronger role in Kenya. Also, school curricula have been employed to emphasize national identity to a much larger extent in Tanzania than in Kenya.
At the same time, Kenya is so ethnically fragmented that inter-ethnic coalition building is always a necessary component of a strategy to secure a stable power base. The most numerous ethnic group, the Kikuyus, comprise only about 17 percent of the population. Other important groups include the Luo and the Kisii, mainly inhabiting Nyanza province on the brinks of Lake Victoria (see Figure 1) (Kimenyi and Ndung'u 2005) . In practical terms, the likelihood of voting for the opposition was to a large extent determined by ethnicity and consequently the victims of violence were mostly Kikuyus and members of other groups who have migrated to the Rift Valley in the decades prior to and after Independence.
In 2002, Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, formed a coalition spanning a broad range of groups, including Kikuyus, Luos, Luhyas and others, organized in the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) party. Moi was not running. Instead, Uhuru Kenyatta, another Kikuyu and son of Jomo Kenyatta, was at the top of the KANU ticket. Kikabi campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption and reform and won in a landslide.
The 2007 elections
After the 2002 election, the multi-ethnic coalition behind Kibaki and the NARC movement disintegrated. Kibaki was perceived by some to be reverting to the bad old ways of Kenyan politics by relying heavily on his powerbase of Kikuyu, Meru and Embu support (see e.g. Mueller 2008 , Wrong 2009 ). . Election results were released gradually. The first results showed a strong lead for Odinga in the race for president. As more results arrived however, the lead narrowed, and when the final results were announced on December 30 th they showed a narrow win for the incumbent, Mwai
Kibaki. Hours after the announcement of this highly controversial outcome, Kibaki was sworn in as President in a ceremony witnessed only by a few political backers and not broadcast on television. In A new political force emerged, namely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), headed by Raila Odinga, a Luo and son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The ODM gathered prominent leaders from the Luhya, Kalenjin, Maasai and other communities. In response, Kibaki formed a new party, the Party of National Unity (PNU). In the run-up to the 2007 elections, both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. Opinion polls taken before elections reveal strong correlations between ethnicity and voting intentions (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero 2008) . 3 In particular, Kibaki reneged on a "Memorandum of Understanding" he had signed with coalition partners.
The memorandum was widely perceived as implying that Luo Leader Raila Odinga was to be nominated for a newly established post of Prime Minister.
a press conference on January 1 st , 2008, chairman of the Election Committee, Samuel Kivuitu, acknowledged that irregularities had occurred and, stunningly, admitted that he did not know for sure who had actually won the election.
The post election violence
Immediately after the announcement of the Presidential election results, violence erupted almost simultaneously in a number of different locations. In Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu and other urban centers, angry mobs took to the streets. The police reacted to these activities with fierce use of force and killed a large number of persons, especially in Kisumu town. In the multi-ethnic slums of Nairobi, ethnic-based fighting erupted and more than a 100 persons were killed. In rural areas and towns of the Rift Valley and other provinces, militias were organized to attack the settlements of ethnic groups perceived as rivals. Most violence was of a "low-tech" nature, conducted mostly with machetes (known in East Africa as "pangas"), clubs, bows and arrows. Only the police made significant use of firearms.
Between 300,000 and 600,000 persons were displaced as a result of the post-election violence. More than 1,100 persons were killed. By the definition applied by some studies (more than 1,000 battle deaths per year) this arguably places the conflict in the "civil war" category. However, the conflict fails to meet several of the more stringent, and more reasonable, criteria for civil wars established by Sambanis (2004) . For example, Sambanis requires that "the parties are politically and militarily organized, and they have publicly stated political objectives" (p. 829). This was not the case in Kenya. Therefore, we do not refer to the post-election violence as a civil war. Nevertheless, comparisons between the results presented here and those from studies of the incidence and severity of civil wars remain highly relevant.
Settlement and aftermath
Throughout the conflict, the international community focused intensely on the violence in Kenya. A United Nations peace mission headed by former UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, backed by the influential community of aid donors, agitated for putting a halt to the violence and attempted to promote negotiations between government-and opposition leaders. In early March 2008, these efforts finally bore fruit, as the parties reached an agreement to form a coalition government. Kibaki retained the Presidency but a new post of Prime Minister was invented and this office was taken by
Odinga. The number of ministers and vice-ministers was expanded significantly and seats shared between candidates from both sides. After this, the violence abated.
The settlement also called for inquiries into, respectively, election irregularities and postelection violence (see below), and for land-and constitutional reform. The call for constitutional reform has now been answered. In a 2010 referendum, Kenyans adopted a new constitution, which, among other things, is intended to strengthen local government and impose constraints on the hitherto extremely powerful presidency. Time will tell whether these measures are sufficient to prevent future recurrence of large-scale ethnic and political violence.
The sections below describe various aspects of the post-election violence in more detail. For more extensive accounts of the violence and its background, see for example Waki (2008) 
Potential determinants of post-election violence

Greed and grievance
One powerful, conceptual framework for understanding the determinants of violent, civil conflict was advanced by Hoeffler (1998, 2004) . They argue that violent conflicts may either result from "grievances", for example related to economic inequality, discrimination, or political exclusion, or from the "greed" of opportunistic, political entrepreneurs, who organize violence if this provides the shortest way to power and wealth. In cross-country analyses of the onset and duration of civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler find that factors most obviously related to greed are more robustly correlated with the incidence of civil war than factors most obviously related to grievance. They conclude that the opportunity to finance and conduct a successful rebellion is the most important factor determining whether or not a country experiences civil war. Similar conclusions are reached by Fearon and Laitin (2003) .
We exploit the greed-or-grievance conceptual framework, but apply a somewhat different perspective than Collier and Hoeffler. In particular, Collier and Hoeffler regard ethnic fractionalization as a factor "most obviously related to grievances", and consider it as a potential determinant of civil wars, alongside other potential factors. In the Kenyan case, we conclude that ethnic polarization between certain groups was obviously a key factor determining the severity of the 2007-8 conflict. The task we set ourselves is to determine why the effect of ethnic polarization was much more devastating in some areas than in others. The paper searches for the factors facilitating the outbreak of ethnic conflict. These factors are grouped according to the greed/grievance dichotomy.
Grievances
Two major, potential sources of group grievance in Kenya are a) land issues, and b) struggles over access to state expenditure. As a predominantly agricultural economy with a rapidly expanding population, the pressure on agricultural land resources in Kenya is severe. Furthermore, the history of land relations since colonial times has given rise to strong inter-ethnic tensions related to land, Grievances related to land are proxied in this study by two variables. First, a measure of land inequality is introduced (see below for data sources). The gini coefficient of agricultural land holdings among households in rural areas is used. A drawback of this measure is that no information is included about "horizontal inequalities", that is, the correlation between land holdings and ethnic background (Stewart 2002) . Presumably, land inequality is a more potent source of conflict if, for example, the largest farms are owned disproportionately by ethnic "outsiders". Such data is not available since individual level data on ethnicity is not included in the survey that collected data on land. Second, a measure of rural population density is used.
Important grievances are also related to the distribution of public expenditure. Citizens depend on the government for the provision of a number of essential, public goods, such as water, sanitation, electricity, roads, schools, clinics and hospitals. The limited financial resources of the government mean that coverage for all these goods is far from universal. Qualitative as well as quantitative evidence suggests that the distribution of government spending is determined to a large extent by ethno-political factors (e.g. Burgess et al. 2009 ). We assume that frustration is more likely to result from absolute or relative decline in access to public goods than from low levels of service provision. Absolute levels of service standards represent the cumulated effect of public investment decisions over many years. On the other hand, the change in access to services experienced over recent years is directly linked to the policies of current and recent governments.
Even if a group has lower access to public goods than other groups, it is unlikely to react aggressively to this state of affairs if it is currently experiencing rapid increase in access. Conversely, a decline in access to electricity, water or other goods is likely to engender disappointment and frustration, even if local levels of access remain relatively high, compared with other areas. Hence, one potential source of grievance is the relative decline of public goods provision. Our measure of grievances related to the distribution of public expenditure is the increase (positive or negative) in the share of households with access to piped water into their dwelling between 1997 and 2005. Piped water is an essential good, the provision of which depends crucially on the public provision of infrastructure.
Also, measures of access to water services are more readily comparable between the household surveys available than measures of access to, say, electricity, schooling, roads or clinics.
Greed
Ethnic polarization may explode into violence because of grievances over land or public resources, especially when the allocation of land and public goods is perceived to take place according to unfair, ethnic criteria. However, ethnic tensions may also be a tool in the hands of opportunistic, political entrepreneurs. Polarization may only have turned violent because local political leaders, or leaders of criminal gangs, saw the post-election period as an opportunity to reach certain targets by means of violence. The Waki Commission collected evidence suggesting that politicians, including members of parliament as well as ministers, played a part in organizing and arming militias. There is even evidence that some perpetrators of violence were paid a piece rate fee for each hut they burned down (Waki 2008, p. 87) . Also, it is well established that the Mungiki criminal network played a very active part in organizing violence in Nakuru, Naivasha town and elsewhere. Other criminal gangs also played a role, at least in the slums of Nairobi. Of course, politicians and even gangsters may simply have responded to demand from local populations, and this demand may be rooted in the grievances discussed above. Alternatively, however, political and criminal leaders may have had more self-centered motives. A politician may wish to engage in ethnic cleansing in order to drive out groups traditionally backing political opponents. He or she may also wish to drive certain groups off the land, in order to make way for occupation by supporters. Land may be used as a patronage good.
Criminal leaders may have taken the opportunity to increase their areas of control, for example within slums. They may also have been able to exploit episodes of violence to recruit new members.
An important factor determining the political-or criminal leader's desire to organize a campaign of violence is the availability and cost of "labor" resources to be deployed in the campaign. Based on this line of reasoning, we use a measure of unemployment among young males (the most likely militia members) as a proxy for "greed". Second, since the bulk of potential, greedy entrepreneurs who may have organized violence are politicians, we use a measure of political competition, measured as the absolute difference in votes for Kibaki and for Odinga in the presidential election, relative to the total number of votes for both candidates in the district. The idea is that the incentive for electorally motivated ethnic cleansing is higher in areas where elections are close.
In addition to the above mentioned factors, which we have tentatively grouped as "greed"-and "grievance" factors, we also include a measure of poverty. Studies of the determinants of civil conflict typically find that per capita income is correlated with conflict. Poverty may be a source of grievances. On the other hand, poverty also improves the recruitment possibilities for political entrepreneurs, and may reduce the local state's ability to respond to violence, because poverty is typically associated with a low potential for taxation.
Data
Fatalities related to post-election violence
The intensity of ethno-political violence is measured in this paper by the per capita number of fatalities related to the post election violence in each district. We exploit the data collected by the Commission is perceived to have worked independently of government interference. Although its chairman is Kenyan, the two other members were foreigners (a New Zealander and a Congolese).
The work and report of the commission was followed intensely by local media as well international observers. Some of the recommendations made by the Commission were highly inconvenient for some members of government. In particular, the Commission advocated that a tribunal was 
Ethnicity data
Due to the highly sensitive nature of issues related to ethnicity in Kenya, data on ethnic composition are generally not published. and 64 who are not recorded in the survey as retired, home makers, full time students, incapacitated or too sick to work. Among these the unemployed are defined as those "seeking work", as well as those reported to be "doing nothing". This is somewhat broader than the definition of unemployment typically used in developed countries, since in this context typically only those who seek work, but cannot find it, are defined as unemployed. In a context of widespread poverty and absence of unemployment benefits it is unlikely that healthy, working age individuals voluntarily remain without a source of income. When individuals are reported to be "doing nothing" rather than "seeking work" it is more likely to result from very low prospects of actually finding a job than from a lack of desire to work. Male youth unemployment is defined as unemployment among males in the workforce aged 15 to 30.
Thirdly, the survey data is used to create a measure of land inequality. In particular, the Gini coefficient of agricultural land holdings among rural households in each district is calculated. A weakness of this measure is the failure to take the quality of agricultural land into account. Land fertility varies widely across Kenya. However, most of this variation is arguably between-rather than within districts, which reduces the importance of this source of error.
Finally, a variable measuring the share of the population with access to piped water in their dwelling ("private" piped water) is calculated from both the 2005 KIHBS and from a previous survey, the 1997 Welfare Measurement Survey, which is also a national coverage survey, collected by the National Bureau of Statistics. Based on these two data sets, the percentage change in access to private, piped water between 1997 and 2005 is calculated.
Election data
Data on the results of the 2007 elections were downloaded from the web site of the Electoral Commission of Kenya, ECK (the ECK has since been dissolved and its website shut down. The data is available on request from the authors). We aggregate data from the electoral constituency level to the district level and create a measure of political competition by calculating the absolute difference between vote shares for President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga. Clearly, these data are not entirely reliable. Indeed, as described above, a main trigger of the violence was the perception that they are not. The Kriegler Commission, which investigated the process of the 2007 elections, concluded that irregularities were observed in several constituencies. Most cheating seems to have taken place in the "heartlands" of each of the main contenders, Kibaki and Odinga.
Hence, the elections probably tend to underestimate the true extent of political competition, especially in areas where one of the candidates dominated. Neither the Kriegler Commission nor other bodies have attempted to produce a "corrected" list of election results. Figure 2 shows that the violence was concentrated in the South Western part of Kenya, and in Nairobi and Mombasa. When trying to understand the causes of post-election violence, it is interesting to compare districts experiencing violence with those that did not. However, we believe that the most relevant type of comparison is between the violence-struck districts and other districts in the same part of the country. Indeed, the areas in the far North and East of Kenya differ from the areas in the South-West along a large number of dimensions, including ecology, ethnicity, religion and livelihood strategies. Also, the presence of the state in several of these districts is very limited.
Descriptive statistics and estimation strategy
Therefore, although violence frequently occurs in these areas, for example in the form of cattle raids (Mkutu 2006) , the incentives for fighting over election results are quite limited. Therefore, our preferred estimation sample includes only the districts were killings occurred, and the districts bordering these. Furthermore, since some of the hypotheses tested in the analysis relate to the effects of land pressure and land inequality, it is natural to focus on mostly rural districts. Therefore, the predominantly urban districts of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are excluded in most analyses.
In robustness tests, all districts with available data are included.
The determinants of post election violence are investigated in this paper with the use of regression analysis. One standard assumption behind regression analysis is the independence of individual observations. This assumption does not strictly hold in the present context. Spill-over effects between districts played a role. We nevertheless continue. First, the assumption of independent observations almost never holds completely in macro-or meso-level datasets. For example, the cross-country data sets used to investigate the causes of civil war are in many cases characterized by spill-over effects from conflict in one country to conflict in another.
Second, the fatalities in the post election data set are for all we know not dependent in the strong sense of having been centrally planned and coordinated. There has been much debate about whether the violence was "spontaneous" or "planned". A great deal of evidence, for example in the Figure 2 , the intensity of conflict varied widely within this area. This variation is not readily explained by geographical proximity. The three districts with the highest number of killings (Nairobi, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu) do not border each other. Third, the main potential effect of spill over between districts is autocorrelation in the regression residuals. In linear regressions, autocorrelation affects statistical inference, but not point estimates. Our preferred strategy for dealing with spill over effects is to introduce province fixed effects (province dummies).
Most spill over seems to have occurred within provinces (for example, the killings in Nakuru and Naivasha towns were to an important extent reactions to killings elsewhere in the Rift Valley). Fixed effects capture the province-wide rise in violence, which occurred as a result of spill over.
Furthermore, in one robustness test we also allow errors to be correlated across districts neighboring each other, using the so-called "spatial error model". A "spatial lag model" is also estimated. In this model, violence in district i is assumed to depend on average levels of violence in neighboring districts (Anselin 1988) .
One factor which exacerbated the negative consequences of the violence, but facilitates statistical analysis, is the fact that the intensity and extent of the post-election violence caught most Kenyans completely by surprise. As described above, there is a history of ethno-political violence in Kenya, especially in the Rift Valley. However, on previous occasions most violence had occurred before rather than after elections. Also, the intensity of violence experienced in 2007/8 was unprecedented. If, on the other hand, the violence had been widely anticipated, then this would give rise to endogeneity problems in the statistical analysis. For example, anticipated conflict may lead to lower investment and therefore to higher poverty and unemployment. In this sense, there might be a reverse, causal link from conflict to poverty and unemployment. Since the conflict was unanticipated by most people, these problems are in fact likely to be of minor importance.
Ethnic polarization
As mentioned above, many quantitative studies of ethnicity and violent conflict have used the Measures such as these are highly useful for studying, for example, the overall picture of civil conflicts across countries or across long stretches of time.
However, when the purpose is to study a specific episode of conflict, such as the 2007/8 post election violence in Kenya, then these measures ignore important information by treating all divisions between groups as equally important. In fact, in most specific conflicts, some fault lines are much more salient than others. In the present case, the context led to a strong emphasis on the distinction between the Kikuyu group on the one hand, and most other ethnic groups on the other. why did polarization between Kikuyus and non-Kikuyus explode into violence in some districts and not, or to a much smaller extent, in others? Table 1 presents summary statistics on the variables used in regression analyses below. Table A1 in the appendix presents the entire data set used. The tables reveal very significant variation on all the variables used. A main concern is the influence of outliers, particularly on the dependent variables. Killings per capita were significantly higher in the districts of Uasin Gishu and, to a smaller extent, Nakuru than in other districts. We address the issue of influential observations in the discussion of regression results below. significant. In particular, the correlation between poverty and intensity of violence is insignificant, and the point estimate is negative. This contrasts with findings from cross-country studies of civil wars, which typically find a strong correlation between income per capita and the intensity of conflict (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 1998 , Fearon and Laitin 2003 , Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004 . Do and Iyer's study of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal also finds that poorer districts were more exposed to violent conflict than others (Do and Iyer 2010) . The reason behind the result is partly to be found in the significant, negative correlation between poverty and Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization (r=-.356, p=.01). Kikuyus have tended to migrate into areas with good economic opportunities and therefore polarization is systematically higher in more affluent areas. The results presented below reveal that among districts with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization, poorer districts did indeed experience more violence. In the first regression, the maximum VIF is 8.4, not far below the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10.
Regression results
At the same time, many variables are insignificant. In subsequent regressions, therefore, insignificant variables are gradually removed from the model. The explanatory power of the model remains high in all regressions, with an R-squared of .86 in the last regression (adjusted R-squared = .81). The VIF gradually drops and reaches the value of 3.9 in the last regression.
As a rule of thumb, VIFs above 10 are often taken as indications of excessive multicollinearity (Neter et. al. 1989 ).
In all regressions in the table, three of the interactions with Kikuyu595 are significant at the 1 percent level, namely those with poverty, male youth unemployment and change in access to private, piped water. None of the other three interaction terms (with population density, land inequality and political competition) are significant. The main effect of Kikuyu595 is significant in three models, while none of the other main effects are significant. These results indicate that ethnic violence is triggered by poverty, unemployment among young men, and decline in access to essential services provided by the state. On the other hand, the hypotheses that land inequality, population pressure and political competition were important conditioning factors behind the postelection violence are not supported. Table 4 tests the robustness of the estimated effects of poverty, youth unemployment and change in access to piped water. All regressions in this table are essentially permutations of regression 4 in Table 3 . First, as indicated above, the dependent variable, killings per capita, is quite skewed. Therefore, the potential effect of outliers on estimated coefficients is an important concern.
Table A1 reveals that the intensity of violence in the district of Uasin Gishu (27 killings pr 100,000 inhabitants) was almost twice as high as in the district with the second-highest intensity of violence (Nakuru, with 16 killings per 100,000 inhabitants). To check whether results are driven by Uasin Gishu, this district is removed in the first regression in Table 4 . In the second regression, Nakuru district, where the highest total number of killings occurred, is also removed. In the third regression, the urban districts of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are included in the estimation sample. This is 6 The VIF for variable i x is defined as Since the dependent variable, killings per capita, is truncated at zero, a tobit model may be viewed as more appropriate than Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Because OLS is more robust than tobit to alternative assumptions about the distribution of regression errors, our preferred estimator is OLS. However, regression 5 in table 4 presents results from applying a tobit estimator.
As mentioned above, it seems likely that violence in some cases spilled over from one district to neighboring areas. Regressions 6 and 7 take account of this possibility by presenting results from, respectively, a spatial error-and a spatial lag model (Anselin 1988 ). In the spatial error model, errors are allowed to be correlated across districts neighboring each other. In the spatial lag model, the level of violence in district i is assumed to depend on the average level of violence in neighboring districts.
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The Waki report distinguishes between killings by gunshot and other killings, and assumes that killings were done by the police if an only if they happened by gunshot. The killings committed by the police were arguably not directly motivated by a strategy of ethnic cleansing. Rather, much police violence resulted from the brutal and clumsy attempt of the police force to control the reactions of frustrated opposition supporters to the announcement of election results. In contrast, most of the killings by non-police perpetrators in rural areas and in the slums of Nairobi were the results of deliberate attempts at ethnic cleansing. From this perspective, the killings committed by civilians were ethnically motivated in a stronger sense than the killings committed by the police. As we are searching for the determinants of ethnic violence, it might therefore make sense to focus only on killings committed by civilians. This is done in regression 7, where the dependent variable is the per capital number of killings committed by civilians (i.e. by non-police perpetrators).
These models are estimated by maximum likelihood.
Finally, regressions 2 and 3 dealt with the potential problems of high outliers by excluding extreme observations. An alternative method for reducing the influence of outliers is to use a binary indicator of violence as the dependent variable. This strategy is implemented in regression 8, where the regressand is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a district experienced at least 10 killings as a result of post-election violence and zero otherwise.
In all these regressions, the three interactions between Kikuyu595 and, respectively, poverty, male youth unemployment and change in access to private, piped water remain statistically significant, in most cases at the one percent level. Therefore, the estimated effects of these variables appear not to be artifacts of sample selection, influential outliers, spatial effects or choice of estimator. The explanatory power of the models is in most cases somewhat lower than in Table 3 , but remains quite high (R-sq = .59 or above).
Areas with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization
In the analyses presented above, hypotheses about triggers of ethnic violence were tested by means of interactions terms between the measure of ethnic polarization (Kikuyu595) and other
variables. An alternative and perhaps more simple method is to restrict the sample to districts with Kikuyu-non-Kikuyu polarization and ask what accounts for variation in levels of violence among these districts. This is the approach taken in Table 5 , which is based only on districts with Kikuyu shares between five and 95. The first regression in this table includes the same six, explanatory variables as the ones interacted with Kikuyu595 in the first regression in Table 3 , namely poverty, male youth unemployment, change in access to piped water, rural population density, land inequality and political competition. Tables 3 and 4 include province dummies. In the sample with only Kikuyu-nonKikuyu polarized districts, however, only Rift Valley province contributes with more than two districts. For this reason, and to save on scarce degrees of freedom, only an indicator for being in the Rift Valley is included. Again, only districts with post-election violence and the districts bordering these are included. In most analyses, Nairobi and Mombasa are excluded (Kisumu is not included in the sample because it has less than five percent Kikuyus).
As in Table 3 , insignificant variables are gradually removed in regressions 2, 3 and 4. The result is that, as in Tables 3 and 4 , poverty, male youth unemployment and change in access to private, piped water emerge as the most important determinants of violence. The robustness of this finding is tested in regressions 5 to 7. In regression 5, Uasin Gishu district is removed. In regression 6, Nakuru district as well as Uasin Gishu are excluded. In regression 7, Nairobi and Mombasa are included. The removal of the high-violence districts of Nakuru and Uasin Gishu does not affect the qualitative findings, although t-statics and explanatory power are somewhat reduced. The inclusion of Nairobi and Mombasa leads to a drop in the coefficient on poverty, which is now insignificant.
Nairobi and Mombasa had higher than expected levels of violence, given their relatively low levels of poverty. A closer look at the variation in violence within these cities, however, does provide support for the view that poverty drives violence. In both Nairobi and Mombasa, violence was much more intense in poor slum areas than in more prosperous neighborhoods (Waki 2008, chap. 5) . The explanatory power of the model is high, with adjusted R-squared values ranging from .67 in regression 7 to .90 in regression 3.
The last regression explores the effects of unemployment in more detail. We have assumed that unemployment among young men is a particularly potent driver of violence because unemployed young males are an excellent recruitment base for "greedy" entrepreneurs of violence. However, unemployment is also a potential source of frustration, or "grievances". If violence is driven by the grievances of the general population, overall unemployment should be equally important as unemployment specifically among young men. On the other hand, if violence is driven by the ease of organizing a violent campaign, unemployment among young men would be particularly important.
Regression 8 includes overall unemployment and male youth unemployment simultaneously. The two variables are highly correlated (r = .89) and so their effects are difficult to distinguish.
Nevertheless, the results are interesting. The effect of overall unemployment is completely insignificant and the point estimate is negative. Male youth unemployment, on the other hand, retains a high, positive coefficient, which is almost significant (t = 1.77, p=.135). Given the small sample size and the high correlation between the two unemployment variables, the fact that male youth unemployment (and also poverty) fall just short of being significant in regression 8 is not surprising. What deserves attention is the fact that male youth unemployment completely dominates overall unemployment. This supports the view that unemployment among young men is a particularly potent source of violence. It also gives some support to the view that the ethnic violence was driven by the "greed" of political entrepreneurs rather than the grievances of the general public.
Conclusion
As is the case with many conflicts in Africa and elsewhere, the 2007/8 post-election violence was widely perceived as the result of long-standing ethnic antagonisms (e.g. New York Times 2007).
The results presented here show that this view is highly simplistic. The outbreak of post-election violence was triggered by the combined effect of ethnic polarization, a flawed election process and economic forces such as poverty, male youth unemployment and lack of access to public services.
Following the influential conceptual framework outlined by Collier and Hoeffler, these economic factors were tentatively viewed as proxies for "grievances" (access to piped water),
"greed" (male youth unemployment), or both (poverty). Therefore, the results indicate that grievances of the general public and the greed of powerful individuals both contributed to generating violent conflict in Kenya.
In contrast with some qualitative accounts of the post-election violence, we find little evidence that land inequality, land pressure or political competition were decisive factors behind the outbreak of conflict. Future research should investigate whether the insignificant effects of land inequality is driven by the failure to measure "horizontal inequalities", that is, inequalities in land ownership between different ethnic groups (Stewart 2002 ).
The findings have interesting policy implications. The fact that the drivers of ethnic conflict appear to be economic in nature suggest that perhaps the most effective means to avoiding ethnic conflict is not to address the issue of ethnicity directly, for example through nation-building policies or decentralization to local governments of ethnically homogeneous areas (the latter option has been hotly debated on Kenya under the heading of "majimbo", or federalism). A focus on standard aspects of economic development, such as poverty, unemployment and public services, might be more effective.
Africa's disappointing growth performance is sometimes explained as a result of ethnic fragmentation (Easterly and Levine 1997) . This explanation may well be descriptively valid, but the results presented indicate that it is not valid as an excuse for the leaders of a country with poor economic performance: A benevolent government does not face a trade-off between pursuing ethnic peace and economic development -strategies that bring about development also facilitate peace. 8.4 7.9 5.7 3.9 OLS regressions. Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these districts, are included. Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are excluded. The variables interacted with Kikuyu595 are entered as deviations from means. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these districts, are included, except in regression 4, where all districts with available data are included. Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu are also excluded, except in regression 3 and 4. The variables interacted with Kikuyu595 are entered as deviations from means. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of t statistics in brackets. Only districts with PEV killings, and the districts bordering these districts, are included. Nairobi and Mombasa are excluded, except in regression 7. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
